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1 Introduction  
When Dutch ISAF troops entered Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province in 2006, they went to great 
lengths to be impartial and understand the sensitivities between the rivaling tribes. After the 
Dutch command was handed over to the Americans in 2010 the latter immediately legitimized 
the power of the strongest local leader, trained his forces and gave him large funds all to keep 
the Taliban at bay (Beeres, Van der Meulen, Soeters & Vogelaar 2012, p. 173). 
In Bosnia in 1996 a British IFOR contingent embedded with the Americans in Tuzla was 
allowed to  drink alcohol and have dinner in town. The Americans on the other hand were 
confined to the base unless for patrols or special assignments, all requiring minimal four 
vehicles. The Americans were ordered even to wear their helmets when on the base (Bauman 
2004, p. 134). 
When UNIFIL II was deployed in Southern Lebanon in 2006 all participating nations were 
bound by the same ‘Rules of Engagement’. In practice most nations had their own 
interpretation of these rules. The French for instance understood the possibility of using force 
against both Hezbollah and the Israeli army while the Italians only wanted to use force against 
Hezbollah (Ruffa 2013, p. 17).   
What explains similar armies behaving differently in comparable operational circumstances? 
An important contribution to the academic debate regarding similar armies showing 
significant variation executing the same operation was made by Chiara Ruffa. In ‘What 
Peacekeepers Think and do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian and South 
Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’ Ruffa (2013) explains the 
difference in these armies operational styles by means of Social Constructivism (p. 2). 
Although this theory thus has explained differences in executing classic peacekeeping 
operations it has never been tested on armies dealing with a security gap. A security gap 
occurs when international actors fail to deploy civilian police forces (in time) and domestic 
forces are unable to provide public security while at the same time international peacekeepers 
avoid this role (Friesendorf 2012, p. 12). This thesis wants to test if Social Constructivism, or 
more specifically its derative ‘Strategic Culture’, can explain why similar armies behave 
differently in a security gap. This will be done by looking at Kosovo as a case study.  
As a result of Serb atrocities against Kosovar Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo 
ultimately a multinational peacekeeping force was implemented in Kosovo in June 1999. This 
force was known as KFOR (Kosovo Force). As Serbian forces left Kosovo within two weeks 
after KFOR’s deployment (Brocades Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). KFOR found itself confronted 
with a ‘security gap’. Soon it became clear that most national KFOR contingents differed in 
the way they executed public security tasks. In this thesis I will focus on three of these 
countries; the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Despite each having 
comparable equipment, training standards and procedures (NATO) every one dealt differently 
with the ‘security gap’. This leads to the following main research question:  
“Does the theory of Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the difference in the way 
similar armies deal with a security gap?” 
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In order to answer the research question the following specific questions need to be 
addressed:  
1) What is Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture? 
2) Does Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the US approach with regard to 
providing public security in Kosovo?  
3) Does Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the British approach with regard 
to providing public security in Kosovo?  
4) Does Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the Dutch approach with regard 
to providing public security in Kosovo?  
Basically, according to social constructivism, social structures like trade relations, domestic 
preferences, states and armies are for the most part (if not completely) based on shared 
immaterial concepts like ideas, norms and assumptions and to a much lesser extent (if at all) 
on objective ‘materialist’ factors like biology, technology and the environment (Wendt 1999, 
p. 1; Slaughter 2011, p. 19). The concept of strategic culture fits in the constructivist discourse 
as according to the strategic cultural view the behavior of states and armed forces is equally 
influenced, shaped and based on immaterial concepts. The notion of strategic culture was first 
used by Jack Snyder in his analyses of American and Soviet strategic cultures four decades 
ago (Duffield, 1999; Klein, 1991; Meyer 2005, p. 51; Snyder 1977). Since then four 
generations of scholars have further developed this concept, often in ongoing disagreement 
with each other. This has resulted in, as Toje (2009) states, “a rich flora of strategic culture 
research” (p. 7). However, all generations of strategic cultural scholars agree that historic 
experiences play an important part in the making and shaping of a strategic culture. Although 
many strategic preferences of states “are rooted in the ‘early’ or formative military 
experiences of the state or its predecessor” more recent significant experiences can also 
“reshape a nation's strategic culture very quickly” (Johnston 1995, p. 34; Lord 1992, p. 267).  
This thesis wants to demonstrate that the theory of Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture 
can be used to explain the difference in the way armies deal with a security gap. It will present 
evidence that specific recent experiences like a military defeat, a military victory or an 
experience of collective guilt, can quickly impact a nations strategic culture and subsequently 
lead to different specific operational behavior. As this thesis will show, a recent military 
defeat will lead to political and military restraint when considering participating in future 
military deployment. And when troops are indeed committed an aversion of own casualties 
will result in a generally reserved operational bearing and above all a strong emphasis on 
measures of force protection when confronted with a security gap. A recent experience of 
military victory will have a somewhat opposite effect and result in a more assertive 
operational attitude combined with subsidiary measures of force protection. Both of which 
benefit public security tasking. When a nation has recently experienced an event resulting in 
collective guilt it demonstrates an initial reluctance to participate in new military operations 
but, as the case study shows, a subsequent enthusiasm and commitment to public security 
operations. It must be noted however that the relative permissiveness of the operational 
environment could have attributed to this ensuing extravert approach.  
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The research strategy for this thesis is to compare the armies of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands (as part of KFOR), which are similar in many respects but yet 
dealt differently with the security gap in Kosovo. The independent variable for this research is 
the ‘threat perception of the operational environment’ which will be operationalized by 
looking specifically at three different types of significant historic experiences, each 
influencing one of the three nation’s strategic cultures. These are experiences of military 
defeat, of military victory and of (collective) guilt. 
The way armies execute public security tasks in the security gap are the dependant variables. 
To operationalize these I have chosen three strands of activities that are typical for public 
security peacekeeping operations: Security Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
and Force Protection (Ruffa 2013, p.8). In short, security operations are the normal day to day 
activities of an army in a peacekeeping environment and include activities like patrolling, 
manning checkpoints, disarming armed groups, preventing (armed) hostilities and providing 
public security. Civil Military Cooperation is the “cooperation between the military on the 
one hand and civilian institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United Nations 
etc.) on the other ”(Mockaitis 2004, p. 5). And force protection are all measures taken to 
protect military personnel and military locations.  
By means of ‘controlled comparison’ I will compare the abovementioned three KFOR 
contingents and compare the way they execute Security Operations, Civil Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection. Concluding, I will label each country’s effort and 
qualify each country as either minimalistic, intermediate or vacuum-filling. Or in other words, 
minimal effort, intermediate effort or maximum effort 
An important source for this research has been Soldiers and Civil Power by Thijs Brocades 
Zaalberg which describes several complex peacekeeping operations and the differences 
between nations when dealing with power vacuums and CIMIC. Another key source has been 
Thomas Mockaitis’ Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The case of Kosovo in 
which, among others, the American and British approach of CIMIC in Kosovo is analyzed. 
Lastly, the nations researched in this thesis all have done their own research regarding their 
peacekeeping operations. These studies not only shed an historical light on their operations in 
Kosovo but also on previous operations which helps to put their actions in Kosovo into a 
broader strategic cultural perspective. These studies will be combined with books and 
newspapers like the Washington Post and the New York Times who have written about the 
operations in Kosovo and interviewed soldiers. 
From the many nations participating in KFOR I have selected the Americans, the British and 
the Dutch for this research. This is firstly motivated by the fact that much research already has 
been done regarding their peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and the relatively wide 
availability of useful published material. Secondly, these three militaries have comparable 
equipment, training standards, procedures (NATO) and peacekeeping experience on the 
Balkans. And all three were operating under the same mandate and KFOR instructions 
regarding public security. But at the same time the studied contingents show significant 
variation when executing Operational Activities, CIMIC and Force protection. And although 
the threat level was possibly initially not identical for all three sectors, all sectors became 
equally permissible after the first few months of deployment.  
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Chapter 2 will cover the theoretical framework which will begin with the phenomenon of the 
security gap followed by the historical development and state of the art of social 
constructivism and strategic culture. In chapter 3 I will treat the research strategy for this 
thesis and discuss the independent and  dependent variables and the strategy for data 
collection. The three case studies will be covered in chapter 4. In chapter 5 I will discuss the 
conclusions of this thesis.  
2 Theoretical Framework  
In this chapter I will first discuss the phenomenon of the security gap and the two schools of 
thought that propose different ways of how armies should deal with this gap. Secondly I will 
elaborate on the historical development and state of the art of two cultural theories that 
subsequently could explain armies’ and nations’ preferences for either school of thought. 
These theories being firstly ‘social constructivism’ and secondly its derative ‘strategic 
culture’. Concluding I will explain which variation of strategic culture I will test in this thesis.  
2.1 The Security Gap 
The term ‘security gap’ was first used by scholars in 1998 and has since been used to describe 
the power vacuum that occurs when international actors fail to deploy civilian police forces 
(in time) and domestic forces are unable to provide public security while at the same time 
international peacekeepers avoid this role (Friesendorf 2012, p. 12). When a security gap 
occurs the main question  is whether the military, the (often multinational) peacekeeping 
forces already in place, should step in and get involved in the execution of public security 
tasks. Until the KFOR operation and the Australian-led operation in East Timor (INTERFET), 
both of which were initiated in 1999, there was international consensus that the answer to this 
question should be negative (Jakobsen 2002, p. 1). This because traditionally most military 
feel they should to stay away from public security tasks or keep their involvement as limited 
as possible. The military are reluctant because they are not trained for it, fear that it degrades 
their combat readiness, worry about the effect it might have on their military identity and 
usually lack the mandate for it (Perito 2004, pp. 4-5; Friesendorf 2012, p. 11). While most 
agree that there are clearly cases were only the military could provide security most would 
also concur that soldiers should not act as judge and jailer as well. This  position is what 
Jakobsen (2002) in his work The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security 
Challenges: As Little as Possible or Filling the Gap? calls the ‘minimalist’ school of thought 
(p. 1). But although the ‘minimalists’ dominated the discourse regarding the security gap in 
the mid-1990s, few realized that the military was actually already playing a significant role in 
public security in the various peacekeeping operations of that decade. During Operation Just 
Cause (Panama 1989), UNITAF (Somalia 1992), MNF (Haiti 1994) and I/SFOR (Bosnia 
1995) the military was noticeably involved in public security in various degrees, thus proving 
that during the 1990s military involvement in public security was actually the rule rather than 
the exception (Jakobsen 2002, p. 4).  
But it were actually both the KFOR and INTERFET operations that finally served as eye 
openers and undeniably showed that even though the military might not like it, there often is 
no alternative but to take on public security tasking in order to prevent chaos and anarchy 
(Jakobsen 2002, p. 4). Especially, and that was what made KFOR and INTERFET so different 
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from previous public security support operations, because in both Kosovo and East-Timor all 
former police, judicial and penal structures had evaporated and had to be built up from 
scratch. So as it happened in both operations the peacekeepers reluctantly ended up executing 
the full spectrum of public security tasking and started acting as police, judges and jailers. 
Proponents of such broad military involvement in public security tasking (opposing the 
aforementioned ‘minimalists’) adhere to what Jackobsen (2002) in turn calls the ‘vacuum-
filler’ school of thought (p. 1). According to the ‘vacuum-fillers’ the involvement of the 
military in public security should simply be accepted as a logical aspect of modern 
peacekeeping operations. Furthermore they argue that the military should actually strive to fill 
the public security vacuum as soon as possible. The rationale behind this view is 
straightforward, as there is general agreement that failing to close the security gap 
immediately could compromise the long-term success of a peacekeeping operation (Jakobsen 
2002, p. 3). And as it happens, only the military will have the capabilities to get this done in 
the initial phase of a peacekeeping operation. Consequently, according to the ‘vacuum-fillers’, 
the military should therefore be smart and make sure it is prepared to be able to take on this 
role which they feel is inevitable (Jakobsen 2002, pp. 2-3). It should be understood that 
minimalists and vacuum-fillers are both opposite ends on a scale on which military forces can 
operate. When Jacobsen (2002) discusses the military involvement in public security in 
various operations this becomes all too clear (p. 6). And although he does not specifically use 
the term ‘intermediate’ I will use it in this thesis when a country falls between the minimalist 
and the vacuum-filler side of the spectrum. 
Now having discussed the phenomenon of the security gap and its different schools of 
thought, the interesting question is then how nations’ and armies’ choices for their position on 
the scale between vacuum-fillers and minimalists can be explained. For this explanation I will 
now take a close look at the theory of Social Constructivism and the concept of Strategic 
Culture.  
2.2 Social Constructivism  
When looking for theories explaining the way peacekeeping operations are carried out, the 
three main approaches of international relations, i.e. realism, institutionalism and liberalism, 
seem hardly useful. While they try to explain why nations participate in peacekeeping 
missions these theories seem far less capable of explaining how these operations are executed. 
Indeed, some scholars argue that the classic international relations theories have yet to be 
successfully integrated into the study of peacekeeping (Kleiven 2012, p. 59). Having 
dismissed the three classic theories as being of little use in solving their puzzle some scholars 
have eventually turned to social constructivism to explain the actual execution of 
peacekeeping operations. In “What Peacekeepers Think and do: An Exploratory Study of 
French, Ghanaian, Italian and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon” Chiara Ruffa (2013) explains the difference in these armies’ operational styles 
during the UNIFIL II mission by means of social constructivism (p.2). Inspired by 
constructivist research in the social sciences she shows that “the interpretation of the 
operational environment influences the way soldiers behave” (Ruffa 2013, p. 2). In other 
words, each army interprets or “constructs” the operational environment differently, which 
leads to different military behavior. Furthermore she provides evidence that these differences 
in perception are “partly shaped by different armies previous experiences” (Ruffa 2013, p. 2). 
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For instance, the Ghanaian and Italian armies previous positive and the French previous 
negative experiences in Lebanon during UNIFIL I could be linked to each nations’ threat 
perception during UNIFIL II (Ruffa 2013, p. 13). But while its relevance and usefulness are 
not in doubt, there is actually some debate as to whether social constructivism is in fact a 
theory or not. Some scholars argue that social constructivism is strictly speaking not a theory 
but rather an ontology, “a set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and 
agency” (Slaughter 2011, p. 19), while others state “it is a social theory on which 
constructivist theories of international politics — for example, about war, cooperation and 
international community — are based” (Adler 1997, p. 323). Alexander Wendt (1999), a 
leading proponent of the social constructivist approach, states in his book The Social Theory 
of International Politics: 
Students of international politics have increasingly accepted “two basic tenets of 
‘constructivism’; (1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by 
shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (p. 1).  
In other words, according to social constructivism, social structures like trade relations, 
domestic preferences,  states and armies are for the most part (if not completely) based on 
shared immaterial concepts like ideas, norms and assumptions and to a much lesser extent (if 
at all) on objective ‘materialist’ factors like biology, technology and the environment. 
Furthermore Wendt states that the interpretation of use and value given to these social 
structures is also socially constructed rather than intrinsic to these structures (Wendt 1999, p. 
1; Slaughter 2011, p. 19). The attribution of value to these social structures is constructed 
from a complex “mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which scholars must understand if 
they are to explain (state or other socially constructed actor) behavior” (Slaughter 2011, p. 
19). The emphasis on social context, for which this theory sometimes is called ideational, 
leads constructivist to focus on matters of identity and belief (Slaughter 2011, p. 19). 
Subsequently “the perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and out-groups and fairness 
and justice” all become important determinants of an actor’s behavior (Slaughter 2011, p 19). 
Thus, when looking at the behavior of armies through the lens of social constructivism, the 
idea is that each army (which is a social structure) interprets or gives ‘value’ (which is based 
on a mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs) to its operational environment (which does not 
have any objective value by itself) and then acts according to this interpretation. 
2.3 Strategic Culture 
Cultural theories like social constructivism since long enjoy an important place in the field of 
international security (Desch 1998, p. 141). The notion that behavior of states and armed 
forces is for a large part influenced, shaped and based on immaterial concepts is what some 
scholars more specifically have encapsulated in the concept of ‘strategic culture’ (Duffield, 
1999; Klein, 1991; Meyer 2005, p. 51). Strategic culture has been part of the constructivist 
discourse for almost four decades and was first used by Jack Snyder (1977) in his analyses of 
American and Soviet strategic cultures, where he “attempts to describe the nuclear capacity of 
the Soviet Union in terms of its cultural proclivities from which nuclear tactics and strategies 
emerged, rather than in material terms alone” (Hadfield 2005, p. 61; p. 5). In his analyses 
‘strategy’ “refers to how hard power can be applied to reach political ends” (Toje 2009, p. 4), 
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and ‘culture’ refers to: “A set of cognitive standards like norms and values and a set of 
evaluative standards such as rules and models that define what social actors exist, how they 
operate and relate to another” (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 6). The main driver behind the concept of 
strategic culture was to understand what was behind what was perceived as irrational state 
behavior. Johnston (1995) states:  
Rather than rejecting rationality per se as a factor in strategic choice, the strategic culture 
approach challenges the ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist framework for analyzing strategic 
choices (…) strategic culture is compatible with notions of limited rationality (where strategic 
culture simplifies reality), with process rationality (where strategic culture defines ranked 
preferences or narrows options) and with adaptive rationality (where historical choices, 
analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice) (pp. 34-35).  
In other words, according to cultural strategists there is no collective model of rationality. 
When Snyder studied Soviet nuclear deterrence policy he concluded that American military 
analysts were erroneously convinced that the Soviets would behave similarly to the 
Americans in both deterrence and actual nuclear war scenarios. The dominant American view 
was based on the rationalist assumption that nuclear wars could not be won and thus would 
not be started as mutual destruction would make nuclear war basically useless for all parties. 
When this comforting assumption proved incorrect as the Soviets were found to have a 
preference for preemptive, offensive use of force, it became clear that what was considered 
irrational for the United States was actually rational for the Soviet Union. The conclusion was 
then drawn that both countries clearly had different preferences which had to be based on 
cultural inclinations (Johnston 1995, p. 32). This eye-opening awareness prompted scholars to 
further investigate the subject (Gray 1981, p. 21). Then primarily focused “on explaining why 
Soviets and Americans apparently thought differently about nuclear strategy”, Snyder, Gray 
and other scholars of the mid-seventies and early eighties are part of what is now called the 
‘First Generation’ of strategic cultural thinkers (Hadfield 2005, p. 61; Johnston 1995, p. 36).  
The main criticism of ‘First Generation’ thinkers holds that they have difficulty defining 
strategic culture. By defining the notion of culture exceedingly broad and encompassing 
nearly all relevant explanatory variables they tend to weaken the theory (Johnston 1995, p. 
37). When one considers technology, geography, organizational culture and traditions, 
historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, 
ideology and the international system all relevant parts of a nation’s strategic culture, there is 
little room for any non-strategic culture-based arguments to explain strategic choices 
(Johnston 1995, p. 37). In fact it could be argued that each of these variables alone could be 
used to explain strategic choices. Another shortcoming of the first generation was that they 
implied that a certain strategic culture automatically would lead to one specific type of 
behavior. This, in retrospect, is far too simple as further research has shown that nations with 
similar strategic cultures could come to different types of behavior (Johnston 1995, p. 37). 
And furthermore, others suggest that a nation can actually have more than one strategic 
culture (Gray 1999, p. 51). And lastly first generation scholars took the problematic view that 
a nation’s strategic culture was coherent, unique and consistent over time. One look at, for 
example, the strategic policy of the United States from say the mid 19
th
 century until 1945, 
one can hardly detect any consistency. Starting with:  
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A general absence of extra-continental adventurism before the 1890s; the ‘spurt’ of overseas 
activity from then until around 1905; the isolationist period from then until 1941 (broken by 
five or six years of Wilsonian idealist engagement); the massive mobilization effort during the 
Second World War; the containment period; followed by detente; etc. (Bloomfield 2012, p. 
440). 
The second generation of thinkers, prominent in the mid-1980s,“started from the premise that 
there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper 
motives for what in fact they do” (Johnston 1995, p. 38). They argued that strategic culture is 
merely a useful tool for the political or military decision-making elite which they can use to 
provide the people with  “popular representations” of what violence is or ought to be and who 
the ‘enemy’ is against to whom this violence legitimately is deployed (Klein 1988, p 136). In 
other words, a state’s elite has its own agenda based on its hegemonic, realpolitik strategic 
interests and uses strategic culture instrumentally to shape the national political and popular 
climate making way for an “acceptable justification for operational strategy” (Johnston 1995, 
p. 39). Second generation scholars like Bradley Klein argue that although strategic culture is 
above all the product of historic experience, there is a big disconnect between strategic culture 
and strategic behavior. As strategic behavior is the domain of the decision-making elite the 
strategic choices they make are thus only restricted by their agendas and interests rather than 
the broad national strategic culture (Klein, 1988). According to second generation thinkers it 
could thus be possible that two countries with a similar strategic culture have leaderships that 
nevertheless each uses a different strategic cultural representations and justifications of 
violence and the ‘enemy’. In other words, the leaderships behave differently than one expect 
when taking note of their strategic cultures (Johnston 1995, p. 40).  
Unsurprisingly though, there are is an important argument that weaken this second generation 
concept. The main issue is that this theory implies that the decision-making elites are more or 
less disconnected from the strategic culture they try to manipulate. This assertion seems rather 
problematic, however, as the elites are immersed in their own national strategic culture and 
are likely to be “constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors created. This 
raises the possibility the elites cannot escape the symbolic discourses they manipulate” 
(Johnston 1995, p. 40). This means that cross-national differences in behavior of the decision-
making elites is actually hardly surprising and should rather be expected (Gray 1999, p. 61).  
The third generation of scholars, who gained prominence in the 1990s, felt the need to make 
serious work of the conceptualization of the ideational independent variables and put specific 
focus on particular strategic decisions as dependant variables (Hadfield 2005, p. 62; Johnston 
1995, p. 41). Both military culture (the culture of military organizations) and political-military 
cultures (the political culture of when and how to use force) and even organizational cultures 
were used as independent variables. Third generation scholars challenge the realist edifice or 
starting point “and focus on cases were structural-materialist notions of interest cannot 
explain a particular strategic choice” (Johnston 1995, p. 41). For most third generation 
scholars the roots of national cultural characteristics and preferences tend to be the product of 
recent experiences rather than that they were conceived in long forgone formative eras 
(Johnston 1995, p. 41). The approach of the third generation has two significant strengths. 
First, they obviously avoid the determinism of the first generation and are careful not to use 
‘behavior’ as the independent variable. By separating behavior from strategic culture and 
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treating behavior as the dependant variable and strategic culture as independent variable they 
try to “falsifiable” the concept of strategic culture (Toje 2009, pp. 6-7). Second, they are 
primarily committed to competitive theory testing by which they pit alternative explanational 
models against each other. Like for instance testing a “realist model against institutionalism 
and organizational-cultural explanations” (Johnston 1995, p. 42). This was impossible from a 
first generation viewpoint where simply no alternative models were possible within its 
methodological framework as all models are automatically an integral part of the all 
encompassing strategic cultural concept (Johnston 1995, p. 42). When discussing eventual 
weaknesses of this third generation approach Johnston (1995) finds its focus on realism 
somewhat problematic. He argues that because state’s choices, driven by realist preferences, 
can range from basic survival to power maximization, there is an enormous range of possible 
optimal strategies. Thus without choosing a particular variant of realism it would be hard to 
set up conclusive comparisons (p. 42). In my opinion this would not have to be overly 
problematic because it would be quite possible to compare states with comparable 
preferences.  
With the turn of the century and the coming of new actors like the European Union and China 
strategic culture now seems to have even a fourth generation of research on the subject. This 
has resulted in, as Toje (2009) states, “a rich flora of strategic culture research” were 
“different academics often apply very different conceptions of the term (p. 7). Today there are 
four main strands, or one could say open ends, that since then divide the strategic cultural 
debate. The organizational, the political, the strategic, and the global strand (Desch 1998, p. 
141). Some scholars argue that militaries have dissimilar organizational cultures and uses that 
explain why different militaries fight differently (Legro 1995, p. 1). Others, most notably 
Elizabeth Kier (1996), emphasize the effect that domestic political considerations have on the 
way militaries operate, instead of this being predominantly the result of external strategic 
drivers. Kier argues that different national political cultures will thus result in various ways of 
executing military operations (p. 187). Katzenstein and others add to this that the domestic 
variation regarding the use of force varies “significantly among states similarly situated in the 
international system” (Desch 1998, p. 142). Johnston (1995) suggests that domestic strategic 
culture, much more than external international forces, best explains a state’s strategy (p. 63). 
Lastly some scholars focus more on global cultural norms instead of domestic considerations. 
They claim for instance that “global cultural norms proscribing the use of particular weapons 
best account for why they are not used” (Desch 1998, p. 143). Concluding, the concept of 
strategic culture went through several decades of interesting development resulting in a wide 
variety of views whose advocates often hotly debate each other (Gray, 1999). What most 
strategic culturist scholars nevertheless agree on is that “ahistorical or ‘objective’ variables 
such as technology, polarity or relative material capabilities are all of secondary importance” 
(Johnston 1995, p. 34). According to Johnston (1995) “it is the interpretive lens of strategic 
culture that gives meaning to these variables (p. 1). He concludes:  
Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policymakers establish more 
accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being 
played, reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice. Done badly, 
the analysis of strategic culture could reinforce stereotypes about strategic dispositions of 
12 
 
other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local 
strategic cultures (pp. 63-64). 
Having discussed social constructivism and strategic culture the next step is now to choose 
which of the aforementioned variations of strategic culture I will use to  explain the difference 
in the way similar armies deal with a security gap. For this I return to the work of Ruffa who, 
as mentioned earlier, presented some evidence that armies’ previous experiences have had 
influence on their perception of their environment and subsequently, behavior (Ruffa 2013, p. 
13). More specifically, Ruffa shows that the various experiences of the French, Ghanaian and 
Italian armies during their Lebanon deployment in the period 1979-2006 had influenced each 
nations’ threat perception resulting in differences in operational behavior in their deployment 
in Lebanon in the 2007-2008 period (the army of South Korea was also studied but was not 
deployed in the first period) (Ruffa 2013, p. 3). Interestingly these experiences could thus be 
typified as relatively recent with a maximum of just over 25 years. 
All four generations of strategic cultural scholars agree that historical experiences play an 
important part in the making and shaping of a nations strategic culture. Johnston (1995) and 
others state that many strategic preferences of states “are rooted in the ‘early’ or formative 
military experiences of the state or its predecessor. For example one could think of the 
legacies of colonialism that still play a significant role in the national identity and strategic 
culture of many former colonies across the globe (Lantis 2009, p. 469). These preferences are 
influenced by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state 
and state elites” (p. 34) as these develop through time. Although few dispute the importance 
of historic events influencing or changing strategic culture, some see strategic culture only 
changing “slowly and lagging behind changes in ‘objective’ conditions” while others add to 
this that “traumatic events - particularly a military defeat - can reshape a nation's strategic 
culture very quickly” (Johnston 1995, p. 34; Lord 1992, p. 267). Meyer (2005) speaks of 
historic experiences, like defeats, victories or guilt, that “plant themselves deep into collective 
memories as ‘lessons learned’ and or ‘beliefs held’” (p. 51). And subsequently influence 
domestic political environment confirming “political-military culture as a product of changing 
domestic political contexts, hence varying as domestic politics varies” (Johnston 1995, p. 41). 
One of the scholars who agrees that historical experiences can alter strategic culture both 
either fundamentally or at a slower more piecemeal pace is Longhurst who refers to these 
experiences as ‘critical junctures’ (Longhurst 2004, p. 17). 
When analyzing strategic cultural literature the most prominent historical events influencing 
strategic culture are the abovementioned historical defeats, victories and to a lesser extent 
(collective) guilt. Only a few defeats have failed to change a nations historical culture (Meyer 
2005, p. 51; Perito 2004, p. 115). The defeat of France in the First, and Germany and Japan in 
the Second World War has had a dramatic impact on these nations’ national identity and 
strategic culture (Kier 1996; Longhurst 2004; Katzenstein 1996). Historic victories often also 
have an impact on strategic culture (Meyer 2005, p. 51; Gray 1981, p.26). For example, the 
American strategic culture in the pre-Vietnam period was largely based on having won all 
major wars and almost all small scale conflicts for the last few hundred years (Gray 1981, p. 
24-26). In turn British strategic culture until the mid-fifties was also based on its Second 
World War victory and relatively successful imperial policing (Mitchell 2004). The notion of 
historic (collective) guilt is discussed by Longhurst (2004) when describing and analyzing 
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Germany’s postwar security policy in ‘Germany and the use of force, The evolution of 
German security policy 1990-2003’. Apart from the grand strategic cultural effects of ‘just’ 
the military defeat Germany suffered in 1945, its postwar strategic culture was also shaped by 
collective guild with regard to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime (Longhurst 2004, 
p.13). 
When explaining behavior by relating it to relatively recent historic experiences as in Ruffa’s 
study, one can clearly not speak about threat perceptions that were rooted in ‘early’ formative 
experiences (Johnston 1995, p. 34). On the contrary it could be argued that these perceptions 
are “clearly the product of recent practice and experience”(Johnston 1995, p. 41). This notion 
of strategic culture being shaped by relatively recent experiences is far removed from the 
views of first generation but rather typical for third generation strategic cultural thinkers 
(Johnston 1995, p. 41). And although Ruffa has used social constructivism and never refers to 
third generation strategic culture I would argue this distinction is rather semantic. This is one 
of two reasons I will use third generation variations of the theory of strategic culture when 
trying to explain the differences in how armies deal with a security gap. The second argument 
for using third generation strategic culture is that contemporary scholars hardly seem to refer 
to first and second generation scholars anymore when explaining strategic behavior. Even 
though the field of third generation strategic culture is divided, it seems that first and second 
generation views have been outdated as they are generally only mentioned when discussing 
the historical development of the discourse (Toje 2009; Bloomfield 2012).  
In addition of what has been mentioned earlier regarding the strategic culture of the United 
States and the United Kingdom (historic victories and imperial policing) much additional 
research has been done on these countries. Of the three subject nations of this thesis however, 
relatively little strategic cultural research has been done regarding the Netherlands. With 
regard to the United States, Lantis (2004) states that “The September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks on the United States served as a turning point in the American definition of national 
security interests and became the lens through which foreign policy would be interpreted for 
the foreseeable future”(p. 362). Thereby clearly recognizing a (traumatic) historic experience 
as a determinant for strategic culture. Additionally the effect that the American involvement 
and subsequent defeat in Vietnam had on American strategic culture can hardly be overstated 
(Appy 2015, Lord 1992).“External events, domestic economic and political pressures, and 
elite predispositions” are further identified as important determinants of American strategic 
culture (Lantis 2004, p. 363). Lastly, the determinant of military victory, as the United States 
having won all major wars and almost all small scale conflicts until Vietnam, has been 
mentioned earlier. With regard to the United Kingdom the historic Atlantic bond with the 
United States has been identified as a "central pillar of the UK's strategic culture" pointing to 
international relations as a strategic cultural determinant (Luif 2006, p. 110). Other scholars 
mention, mostly referring to the period until the mid-twentieth century, Britain’s strong 
maritime strategic culture which was rooted in the fact that Britain as an island relied on a 
navy both for defense and the protection of its commerce (Gray 2006, p. 159). In the latter 
case geography could be identified as an obvious determinant. The determinant of military 
victory has been mentioned earlier with regard to the United Kingdom. Recent strategic 
cultural research regarding the Netherlands has concluded that its strategic culture continues 
to shift away from “war and coercion by means of force” (Biehl, Giegerich, Jonas 2013, p. 
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265). Multiple domestic political considerations for this change have been noted, clearly 
indicating the domestic political environment its determinant (p. 264). 
 
3 Methodology   
 
In this chapter I will cover the research strategy for this thesis and discuss the independent 
and  dependent variables and the strategy for data collection. 
3.1 The independent variable 
The research strategy for this thesis is to compare the armies of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, which are similar in many respects but yet dealt differently 
with the security gap in Kosovo in 1999. The independent variable for this research is: threat 
perception of the operational environment. 
As explained in the theoretical framework, strategic culturalists argue that a nation’s threat 
perception is based on and shaped by its strategic culture. They further state that historical 
experiences play an important part in the making and shaping of that strategic culture. These 
historical experiences can be traumatic events that change a strategic culture very quickly or 
long-term flows of events that only gradually shape it (Johnston 1995, p. 34; Lord 1992, p. 
267). In this thesis I have therefore chosen to use third generation scholar Kerry Longhurst’s 
(2004) definition. Longhurst defines strategic culture as:  
A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held 
by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A 
strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, 
although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative 
periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that 
collective’s experiences (p. 17). 
Longhurst’s definition is typical third generation as it clearly opposes the first generation view 
that strategic culture would be permanent or static. It further discerns itself from many earlier 
definitions by acknowledging that strategic culture can be altered either swift and 
dramatically at fundamental watershed events or at a more slower gradual pace. These options 
make it useful for explaining a wide array of strategic behavior. In this thesis an army’s threat 
perception of the operational environment will be operationalized by looking specifically at 
three types of  historic experiences that had a significant impact on its strategic culture. These 
are experiences of military defeat, of military victory and of (collective) guilt (Meyer 2005, p. 
51). The operationalization of the independent variable will be as follows:  
Historical defeat: the historical experience of a nation’s military defeat which affected its 
strategic culture through ‘lessons learned’ or a change in ‘beliefs held’. By defeat is meant 
any military campaign that is generally experienced and acknowledged as a defeat.  
Historic victory: the historical experience of a nation’s military victory which affected its 
strategic culture through ‘lessons learned’ or a change in ‘beliefs held’. By victory is meant 
any military campaign, short or prolonged, that is generally experienced and acknowledged as 
a victory. 
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Historic (collective) guilt: the historic experience of an event resulting in collective guilt 
which affected a nation’s strategic culture through ‘lessons learned’ or a change in ‘beliefs 
held’. This collective guilt stems from the distress that nations or armed forces experience 
when they accept responsibility for events they are ashamed about. This guilt is generally 
experienced and acknowledged as such. 
Obviously most nations have experienced defeats as well as victories, and some also have 
experienced events that caused feelings of collective guilt, and not all of these experiences 
have affected their strategic culture. In this regard I will qualify these experiences as 
significant when states either ‘distil lessons learned’ from them or they influence or alter 
states ‘beliefs held’ or both (Meyer 2005, p. 51). I will acknowledge this when there is an 
obvious difference in a state’s 1) transmitted ideas and/or, 2) attitudes and/or, 3) traditions, 4) 
and/or preferred methods of operation when comparing these notions before and after the 
significant historic experience. 
3.2 The dependent variable 
The way the armies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands operate in 
the security gap, more specifically execute public security tasks, are the dependant variables. I 
will use Jacobsen’s terminology when labeling their effort either minimalistic, intermediate or 
vacuum filler.  
To operationalize these dependent variables I have chosen three strands of activities that are 
typical for public security peacekeeping operations: Security Operations, Civil Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection (Ruffa 2013, p.8). 
Security Operations: Security operations are the normal day to day framework operations of 
an army in a peacekeeping environment. Security operations include activities like patrolling, 
manning checkpoints, disarming armed groups, preventing (armed) hostilities between former 
belligerent parties and providing public security. The willingness to disarm armed groups is 
indicated by the priority given to the actual enforcing of the disarmament. The importance 
given to providing basic public security is indicated by the number/percentage of military 
police per contingent, the number of arrests that were made when providing public security 
and the overall willingness to maintain public order. Armies can score low, intermediate or 
high.  
CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation is the “cooperation between the military on the one hand 
and civilian institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United Nations etc.) on the 
other ”(Mockaitis 2004, p. 5). I will specifically look at the number or percentage of assigned 
and non-assigned CIMIC personnel per contingent. How many local government functions 
have been taken over or assisted by the military (municipal administration, medical care, 
public utilities)? Armies can score low, intermediate or high.  
Force Protection: Force Protection are all measures taken to protect military personnel and 
military locations. I will specifically look at the level of priority given to the security of the 
contingents bases or lodging locations, its movements (armored or un-armored, number of 
vehicles or on foot) and dress codes. Armies can score low, intermediate or high. 
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By means of ‘controlled comparison’ I will compare the abovementioned three KFOR 
contingents and compare the way they execute Security Operations, Civil Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection and qualify each country as either minimalistic, 
intermediate or vacuum-filling.  
Considering the above discussed theory I would come to the following preliminary 
hypothesis: 
1) When a nation has suffered a relatively recent historic defeat which affected its 
strategic culture it will act minimalistic when confronted with a security gap 
2) When a nation has experienced a relatively recent military victory which affected its 
strategic culture it will act intermediate or vacuum filling when confronted with a 
security gap 
1) When a nation has relatively recently experienced an event resulting in collective guilt 
which affected its strategic culture it will act as a vacuum-filler when confronted with 
a security gap 
3.3 Strategy for data collection 
The sources that will be studied in this research will include literature on the intervention in 
Kosovo and the Security Gap. A key source regarding strategic culture and its development is 
Thinking about Strategic Culture by Ian Johnston. In this very often quoted work he describes 
the three generations of strategic cultural thinkers discussing their strengths and weaknesses. 
Another important source for this thesis is Soldiers and Civil Power by Thijs Brocades 
Zaalberg. Zaalberg describes several complex peacekeeping operations and the differences 
between nations when dealing with power vacuums and CIMIC. Although almost a decade 
old it is still the most comprehensive to date regarding the Dutch intervention in Kosovo. 
Additionally Zaalberg also describes important aspects of the British and American 
participation in Kosovo. Through Zaalbergs bibliography I came in touch with works from 
Priest, Perito, Sanger and Van Loon. A third very relevant source has been Thomas 
Mockaitis’s Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The case of Kosovo in which, 
among others, the American and British approach of CIMIC in Kosovo is analyzed. Lastly, all 
three militaries of the nations researched in this thesis have done their own research regarding 
peacekeeping operations. These studies not only shed an historical light on their operations in 
Kosovo but also on previous operations which helps to put their actions in Kosovo into a 
broader strategic cultural perspective. The most relevant of these official military publications 
are the U.S Army’s ‘Lessons From Kosovo, The KFOR Experience’, ‘Disjointed War, 
Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999’, the ‘Somalia After Action Report’ and the British 
Army’s ‘Operation Banner: an analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland’. These 
studies will be combined with books and newspapers like the Washington Post and the New 
York Times who have written about the American involvement in Kosovo and interviewed 
soldiers. 
4 Case studies  
In this chapter I will start with the historic events that led to the Kosovo crisis concluding with 
the state of the operational environment faced by the international peacekeeping forces when 
17 
 
first entering Kosovo. Then I will discuss three case studies and analyze the way the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands operated in the unfolding security gap in 
Kosovo. Each case study will start with an historical overview of the selected nations’ 
strategic culture emphasizing a relatively recent significant historical event which influenced 
its strategic culture. Then I will describe and analyze the way each nation executed Security 
Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection in Kosovo and qualify 
each country as either minimalistic, intermediate or vacuum-filling with regard to the security 
gap using Jacobsen’s terminology.  
4.1 The Kosovo Crisis and KFOR 
The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was created under the leadership of Tito in 
1945  was composed of six republics. Of these the Socialist Republic of Serbia was the largest 
and most populated. To prevent Serbia of becoming too powerful, two autonomous governed 
provinces were established within Serbia’s borders, of which Kosovo was one (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 34). And although the majority of the 
population in Kosovo was of Albanian ethnicity most public functions were occupied by the 
Serbian minority and tensions between the Albanian en Serbian communities were never far 
from the surface. Despite Kosovo was allowed to have a seat in the central government, have 
its own parliament, a police force and national bank in 1974, the Albanians were still 
considered a minority with a lower status (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
2000 p. 36; Youngs & Dodd 1998, p. 10). After a few peaceful years things began to 
deteriorate when Tito died in 1980 and Yugoslavia drifted into economic and political unrest 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 36; Youngs & Dodd 1998, p. 11). 
And as many Serbs left Kosovo mostly because of the poor economic situation, it was often 
perceived that they had left fearing Albanian reprisals. The idea of Serbs having to leave 
Kosovo due to Albanian pressure struck a nerve with Serbs nationwide as Kosovo is strongly 
connected to the national Serbian identity. As it was in Kosovo that the Serbs in the fourteenth 
century fought some decisive battles with the old Ottoman Empire. And although the Serbs 
actually lost most of the battles, this period is celebrated as the time when the Serbs curbed 
the Ottoman invasion of Europe (Wentz 2002, p. 318). 
It was in this poor economic climate and amidst growing ethnic tensions that Slobodan 
Milosevic was elected president of the Serbian Republic in 1989. Known as a strong advocate 
of Serbian nationalist empowerment, Milosevic was known for his strong anti-Albanian 
rhetoric and would soon prove to deliver more than just words. And about a year after 
Milosevic was in office, Serbian authorities launched a series of measures aimed at retracting 
Kosovar autonomy and strongly curtailing the Kosovar Albanians (Wentz 2002, p. 312; 
Zaalberg 2005, p. 291). Finally, continuing repression convinced many Kosovar Albanians 
that only armed resistance could change their dire situation. On 22 April 1996, four 
simultaneous attacks on Serbian security personnel were carried out in several parts of 
Kosovo (Youngs & Dodd 1998, p. 15). A hitherto-unknown organization calling itself the 
‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ (KLA) subsequently claimed responsibility (Wentz 2002, p. 312).  
What followed were years of civil war with attacks of the KLA against Serbian targets and the 
Serbs executing revenge attacks on the Albanians. This resulted in more than fifteen hundred 
ethnic Albanians killed by August 1998 and four hundred thousand forced out or having fled 
the province (Clark 2007, p. 10; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). 
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Triggered by a massacre in September 1998 an agreement between Serbia and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was signed to end the atrocities 
committed by the Serbian forces (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 
75). This agreement resulted in a monitoring mission named the Kosovo Verification Mission 
(KVM). But within months it became clear the mission had failed as the KVM seemed totally 
incapable of stopping the violence (Clark 2007, p. 10). The attacks from both adversaries even 
intensified and the number of Serbian forces did not decline opposing earlier promises. In the 
meantime more and more ethnic Albanians were driven out Kosovo (Clark 2007, p. 10). 
In January 1999 NATO increases its pressure on Serbia by threatening with airstrikes and 
peace enforcing ground operations. In February the international community tries to get both 
the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanian shadow government to agree on a cease fire, negotiating 
in the French town of Rambouillet (Zaalberg 2005, p. 292). The main goal was to agree on a 
withdrawal of the Serb security forces and a disarmament of the KLA (Wentz 2002, p. 314). 
But, despite frantic efforts of the international community, the Serbs ultimately refuse to sign 
the agreement. To make matters even worse, Serbia actually launched a major offensive in 
Kosovo, causing even more civilian casualties and refugees (Clark 2007, p. 12). Ultimately a 
final warning was given by the UN Secretary-General ordering the Serbian authorities to 
immediately stop their aggression in Kosovo. When the Serbian government again fails to 
comply NATO, with consent of the UN Secretary General but bypassing the UNSC, 
subsequently launches an air campaign and starts bombing Serbian military targets on March 
24, 1999 (Clark 2007, p. 12; Zaalberg 2005, p. 293).  
Finally, after nearly two months of hammering airstrikes, the Serbian government was back at 
the negotiation table. Serbia had nine major highways, seven airports and fifty-nine bridges 
destroyed. Two thirds of its main industrial plants were severely damaged and seventy percent 
of its power stations were out of order (Priest 2003, p. 272). And, although the final political 
status of Kosovo remained unclear, in June an agreement was signed. The agreement foresaw 
the withdrawal of all Serbia’s military and security forces from Kosovo, the unconditional 
return of all refugees and the implementation of an international peacekeeping force (Gordon 
et al 2002, p. 1; Zaalberg 2005, p. 294). This NATO force was to become known as Kosovo 
Force or KFOR. Now under international rule KFOR had Kosovo divided into five 
geographic areas each under control of a Multinational Brigade (MNB). Each MNB was led 
by a lead nation. These lead nations were Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
France and Italy. The MNB’s were for a large part subordinate to British general Michael 
Jackson who was KFOR’s first overall commander (Mokaitis 2004, p. 8). 
When the first KFOR troops entered Kosovo on June 12 1999 the local Serbian authorities 
had literally dropped everything and had only one priority; preparing to leave the province in 
one piece. Almost overnight there were no functioning police forces, no functioning courts 
and no penal system (Jakobsen 2002, p. 7). And with the Serb security forces no longer 
around or on duty the Albanian population started attacking the largely unprotected Serbian 
minority (Jakobsen 2002, p. 8). Especially in places where Serbian forces previously had 
committed war crimes the revengeful Albanians were killing hundreds of Serb civilians 
(Priest 2003, pp. 273, 282). Although the primary task of KFOR was to enforce peace and 
deter renewed hostilities between the Serbian forces and the KLA, they also had a mandate to 
“establish a secure environment” (Zaalberg 2005, p. 296). In any case general Michael 
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Jackson, KFOR’s commander, did not need any encouragement to start restoring order. 
According to Jackson taking action was actually the only logical thing to do: 
For those who say this is not for the military, my next question to them would be, for whom is 
it when there is nobody else there? Or do you just let it go? Do you allow anarchy? What do 
you do when a foot patrol of soldiers in Pristina comes across a Serb about to murder an 
Albanian. You don’t have a secure environment with murderers running around (Jackson 
1999, cited in Jakobsen 2002, p. 2). 
Jackson was soon backed in this by the supreme NATO leadership. Three weeks after the start 
of the ground operation NATO affirmed that KFOR troops had full authority to perform 
police tasks (Brocades Zaalberg 2005, p. 320). Not much later Jackson was actually ordered 
by his top NATO superior, the American general Wesley Clark, to arrest ‘looters and 
arsonists’ (Brocades Zaalberg 2005, p. 321). And although Jackson had already begun 
drafting something of a uniform KFOR policy regarding the execution of public security 
tasks, it would become a big challenge to get all MNB’s act accordingly. It would soon be 
clear that the German, British, American, French and Italian MNB’s all had their own way of 
executing law enforcement in their respective MNB’s.  
4.2 The United States 
Since its founding the United States has been almost continuously involved in military 
engagements ranging from low-intensity conflicts, occupations and peacekeeping operations 
to full scale warfare participating in two world wars. Until 1945 these ventures almost 
exclusively ended in victory for the United States, shaping its strategic culture and growing 
typical national beliefs (Gray 1981, p. 26). And until the ‘loss’ of Vietnam in the early 1970’s 
many of these beliefs had remained unchallenged for numerous decades. But the traumatic 
experience of Vietnam, with more than 58,000 Americans killed and 153,000 wounded, 
served as a national benchmark for failure as the carpet was pulled under the long comforting 
notion of American technical and moral superiority (Herring 1986, p. 256). In  American 
reckoning: the Vietnam War and our national identity Christian Appy (2015) states:  
Never before had such a wide range of Americans come to doubt their nation’s superiority; 
never before had so many questioned its use of military force; never before had so many 
challenged the assumption that their country had higher moral standards (p. 3).  
A poll in 1971 showed that an unprecedented 58% of the American people not only thought 
the war in Vietnam was wrong but also that it was immoral (Appy 2015, p. 7). Clearly 
Vietnam had seriously shaken up the American strategic culture resulting in a national 
consensus that “the United States should use military force only as a last resort; only where 
the national interest is clearly involved; only when there is strong public support; and only in 
the likelihood of a relatively quick, inexpensive victory” (Lord 1992, p. 270). These views 
were subsequently formulated in the Weinberger and later Powell-doctrine in the early 
nineties. But besides the watershed experience of Vietnam and the resulting reluctance with 
regard to the use of military force, most scholars roughly identify, at least up till Kosovo, four 
main characteristics typical for the American strategic culture.  
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Firstly the United States believed it was a unique force for good in the world and “heir to 
powerful traditions of political liberalism - limited government and the rule of law - and of 
religious enthusiasm and moralism” (Lord 1992, p. 265). From this notion sprung an idealistic 
projection of its values to the rest of the word seeking to spread freedom and democracy to 
those denied the benefits of the American system (Nix 2012, p. 98). Secondly, it was widely 
believed that the United States actually could achieve anything “that they set their hands to in 
earnest”(Gray 1981, p. 27). Johnson (1997) concurs and states “Americans typically believe 
that any problem can be solved with the right amount of effort and dedication” (p. 349). He 
continues with the example of the US advisory role in South Vietnam: 
Frustrated that the South Vietnamese were not adopting the American cultural norm that 
advocated an adherence to an established programmatic method in order to measurably 
advance towards an agreed end-state and peace, the US (simply) took over the war at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels (p. 349).  
Third comes the notion some scholars have of the American people of being pragmatic with 
an inclination to look for technical solutions for a problem (Lord 1992, p. 265). This is also 
reflected in the American emphasis on, when possible, waging a war based on technology 
rather than human attrition (Gray 1981, p. 28). Lastly the United States is OTHER STUDIES 
attributed to be impatient and have a relatively ‘short attention span’ with a desire for quick 
solutions (Nix 2012, p. 99). Nix (2012) concludes the United States has a preference “for wars 
of limited duration, with clearly defined ‘bad guys’, clear paths to victory through 
overwhelming ‘high tech’ force, and a rapid return of forces to America’s shores after conflict 
termination”(p. 98). It were for the most part these strategic cultural notions that were 
prevalent when the United States started deploying troops in Somalia in 1992. The dramatic 
events eventually unfolding in its capital Mogadishu would prove to have a significant impact 
on the American strategic culture.   
When the United States entered Somalia, a country raged by civil war, its mission goal was to 
provide security and food relief. Interestingly the US ambassador in Kenya (neighboring 
Somalia) had reported to Washington to think twice of entering Somalia and makes notion of 
the American strategic cultural ideal of a speedy technical solution. He stated: “I do not think 
Somalia is amendable to the quick fix so beloved of Americans” (Alexander, 2013). When the 
initial calamity of immediate starvation was evaded the mission soon faded from public and 
political interest. When American troops eventually wanted to arrest a prominent warlord in 
Somalia’s capital Mogadishu things soon got from bad to worse. Within the hour two 
American Black Hawk helicopters were shot down resulting in isolated pockets of American 
troops attacked by frenzied mobs of armed Somali. The next day, when the relief operation 
had ended, eighteen American servicemen were killed, 77 were wounded and one was 
captured (Center of Military History United States Army 2003, pp. 5-14). That morning the 
American public woke up with images of cheering Somali’s dragging dead American soldiers 
through the streets, resulting in a wide public outcry (Murray 2008, p. 79). The very Somali 
people the Americans believed they had just saved from starvation had ostensibly savagely 
killed American servicemen (Center of Military History United States Army 2003, pp. 5-14). 
The result was immediate pressure on the Clinton Administration to get all American troops 
out of Somalia immediately (Murray 2008, pp. 79-80). However, with one American captured 
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and the US troops being essential for the sustainment of the UN operation, an instant total 
withdrawal was not an option. The Administration then set the date for ending mission 
support on March 1994, a mere six months after the incident (Center of Military History 
United States Army 2003, p. 13). The events in Somalia had a strong influence on the 
American strategic culture as there was no longer support for humanitarian missions or 
peacekeeping operations. And at the same time there was a strong aversion of casualties 
resulting in what American diplomat Richard Holbrook described as the ‘Vietmalia’ 
syndrome (Perito 2004, p. 115). When, a few weeks after the last American troops had left 
Somalia, large scale massacres were reported in Rwanda, the United States had no intention 
of intervening. As in November 1995 the Bosnian war ended with the Dayton Peace 
Agreements and US peacekeepers were reluctantly deployed in Bosnia, American decision 
makers were adamant the so called ‘Mogadishu line’ was not to be crossed. They meant that 
the UN forces should never become a combatant as what had happened in Mogadishu. So, 
with the American losses in Mogadishu in mind, they thus put a strong emphasis on force 
protection and went in very heavy (Friesendorf 2012, p. 30). Or in the words of a Bosnia 
specialist working for the White House in that period:  
The Administration lost faith in the usefulness of ground troops in 1993, after 18 soldiers 
were killed in a failed raid in Mogadishu. They believe that Somalia demonstrates 
conclusively that you cannot have any casualties. They take this as a matter of faith (Owens 
2000, p. 187).  
When the Kosovo crisis emerged the American public seemed perceptive of images of 
suffering Albanians and opinion polls showed half of the American public in favor of sending 
ground troops in mid April 1999 (Owens 2000, p. 186). But the Clinton Administration 
seemed “to have no confidence that popular support would survive the first casualties” 
(Owens 2000, p. 186). This was initially reflected by Clinton excluding the involvement of 
ground forces and only use airpower (given its relative small risk of American casualties) to 
curb Serbian aggression. On March 24, the start of the US led NATO air campaign against 
Serbia, Clinton stated: ''I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war'' (Erlanger, 
1999). Repeating this statement a week later: “The thing that bothers me about introducing 
ground troops into Kosovo and into the Balkans, is the prospect of never being able to get 
them out” (Owens 2000, p. 187).  
It was clear the American Administration deeply feared the Mogadishu scenario. When in 
June the Serbs finally gave in and the air campaign had proven successful, not a single 
American life had been lost (Priest 2003, p. 273). This, and the fact that after the US led air 
campaign any NATO ground operation without American troops seemed politically 
unthinkable, made the US ultimately deploy ground troops in Kosovo. Be it under the 
condition that since the United States had been driving Bosnia, Europe should now take the 
lead in Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p. 295). And indeed KFOR was thus initially led by a British 
‘three star’ general. The Americans ‘just’ sent a ‘one’ star general commanding their troops 
and choose a sector for their deployment  that supposedly was one of the quieter sectors of the 
province…(Priest 2004, p. 274; Mockaitis 2004, p. 13). 
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4.2.1 The United States in Kosovo  
The American led MNB was responsible for the southeastern part of Kosovo dubbed MNB-
East. With Serbia in its east and north and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) on its southern border, MNB-East measured about 900-square-miles making it no 
bigger than Los Angeles county (Priest 2003, p. 273). This region of Kosovo was initially also 
less damaged than the other MNB areas (Mockaitis 2004, p. 13). The American led MNB 
(including Russian, Greek and Polish troops) was designated Task Force Falcon and counted 
at its height in October 1999 around 8400 troops (Gordon, McGinn, Nardulli, Perry, Pirnie 
2002, p. 103). When the Americans entered their area of responsibility in June 1999 they were 
quickly overwhelmed by rampaging Albanians executing revenge attacks against the 
remaining Serb minority. The Americans were caught by surprise and had difficulties putting 
all the violence in context (Priest 2003, pp. 281, 299). Only in August the violence was 
beginning to die down (Clark 2007, p. 26). During these first chaotic months the Serbs had 
turned from the enemy into the victims and the Albanians, who had been the unofficial ally, 
seemed to have become the new enemy (Priest 2003, p. 291). In words of an American 
soldier: “The Serbs are so much nicer. They offer us alcohol and treat us like kings. The 
Albanians are stupid” (Priest 2003, p. 302). 
4.2.2 Security Operations 
At the start of the employment Task Force Falcon (like all KFOR troops) had two primary 
military tasks. In order to enforce peace and prevent renewed hostilities they firstly needed to 
see to a swift and orderly withdrawal of the Serbian military and security forces from Kosovo. 
Secondly the American troops needed to disarm and demilitarize the KLA (Zaalberg 2005, p. 
295). But as it happened the Serbs left the province in an unexpectedly orderly and disciplined 
manner in less than two weeks (Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). This quickly diminished the need for 
keeping the Serbs and the KLA from fighting each other or Serbian troops attacking Kosovar 
Albanian civilians. The American security operations in the first months of deployment were 
thus characterized by trying to protect the Serbian minority against Kosovar Albanians and 
disarming the KLA. Acting “with a strong force posture and frequent presence patrols” the 
Americans encountered little armed resistance or direct opposition but were unable to 
effectively stop the mayhem that was taking place as soon as the Serb security forces had left 
the province (Gordon et al. 2002, pp. 103-104).  
Although on June 21 KFOR representatives reached an agreement with the KLA about 
demilitarization and disarmament the Americans (and the British) had actually already begun 
confiscating their weapons before this date (Zaalberg 2005, p. 305). According to Zaalberg 
(2005) “the American’s took an overall robust stance on disarmament” (p. 335). The 
Americans were increasingly active raiding KLA headquarters and training locations seizing 
firearms, mines and explosives (Clark 2007, p. 33). Although some authors claim they could 
have done more as “the U.S. military’s strong emphasis on force protection has greatly 
inhibited this type of action on a large-scale basis” (Gordon et al. 2002. p. 108). But despite 
the disarmament of the KLA and the large number weapons and ammunition found, many 
thousands of weapons still remained in the hands of individuals who violently used them 
against Serbian civilians as soon as they had the chance (Gordon et al. 2002, p. 108; Clark 
2007, pp. 23-25). Suppressing interethnic violence, fighting fires and crowd and riot control 
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(often using armored vehicles and even attack helicopters to disperse the crowds) would make 
up the daily operational routine of the American troops during the first months of deployment 
(Clark 2007, pp. 25, 35-36). But the Americans never seemed to have enough troops to really 
quell the violence and found themselves often powerless to prevent the killing, massive 
looting and burning of Serb property (Clark 2007, pp. 23-26). As described by Clark (2007) in 
the report “Operation Joint Guardian, The U.S. Army in Kosovo”, despite aggressive 
patrolling “Murder, assault, kidnapping, extortion, burglary, and arson were reported daily” 
(p. 21). As one American staff officer summarized the early days of the operation:“I think 
everybody was surprised at the amount of retribution that was occurring. We handled it the 
best we could. Short of having a soldier in front of every Serb house, there was no way we 
were going to stop it” (Clark 2007, p. 21). And although a company of 120 US military police 
who were trained at basic law enforcement were active in the MNB,  this hardly seemed to 
have made a noticeable difference (Priest 2003, p. 280; Perito 2004, p. 186). Whereas  despite 
the massive looting and arsoning the Americans had made ‘just’ fifteen arrests by July 7 only 
beating the French and Italians who, combined, had arrested six suspects (Zaalberg 2005, p. 
335). This implies that there was simply no will to take on public security tasking too serious. 
According to Lord (1992): “America's political elite has shown little knowledge of or interest 
in ‘imperial policing’ as the British used to describe low-intensity warfare”(p.268). This was 
confirmed in July by US Defense Secretary Cohen who was quoted in the Washington Post 
saying: “The more we do, the less incentive there is for the UN to come in and assume that 
burden (…) This is a mission [providing public security] that does not belong to NATO 
forces” (Smith, 1999).  
Concluding, the Americans seem to have been actively patrolling and maintaining a presence 
in their sector but were not able to stop the violence against the Serb population which 
seemed to have surprised them. A lack of available troops is given as the main reason for not 
being able to keep order. Despite the availability of a useful quantity of military police and the 
number of incidents fifteen arrests were made. They were successful in disarming the KLA 
and took the initiative to confiscate their weapons even before there was a formal agreement 
on their disarmament. It is noted however that they might have been even more successful had 
it not been for reasons of casualty aversion. The statement of Defense Secretary Cohen 
implies that more could have been done but that there was no political will. Overall the 
Americans seem to score at best intermediate on operational activities.  
4.2.3 CIMIC 
According to the American military in the Kosovo era, the philosophy was that rebuilding was 
not a task for the military but for NGO’s, the international community and local civil 
institutions (Mockaitis 2004, p. 16). This is reflected in the role CIMIC was given in the 
American military doctrine were it was subordinate to conventional military operations. Its 
primary role was “to clear all civilian obstacles for the tactical commander and enable him to 
fight his conventional battle” (Zaalberg 2005, p. 392). With at one time more than 8.000 
troops in the American MNB, about fifty-eight were dedicated to CIMIC (Zaalberg 2005, p. 
400). Mockaitis (2004) concludes in his work ‘Civil Military Cooperation in Peace 
Operations: The Case of Kosovo’ that the success of the US CIMIC in Kosovo has been 
mixed. If there were successes they seem far less than what would have been expected related 
to the number of troops and resources available (p. 16).  
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Although the American field commanders in Kosovo soon understood their mission was to be 
executed on the streets and in interaction with the population, the US CIMIC activities were  
burdened with strong force protection measures (Priest 2003, p. 282). This overemphasis on 
force protection was clearly unlikely to help CIMIC teams getting closer to the population. 
When for example a CIMIC officer wanted to go to a local meeting his team was required to 
have a force protection unit with extra vehicles making it a rather large convoy. When on 
destination he was required to wear a helmet and body armor making him indistinguishable 
from the soldiers who would be guarding him (Zaalberg 2005, p. 401). Officials from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) complained that this robust display of military power often intimidated 
the already frightened population (Mockaitis 2004, p. 15). Zaalberg (2005) concludes that 
“The force protection measures resulting from the US military’s risk-averse mentality 
hampered the American civil affairs teams in moving among the people” (p. 401). 
Because of the idea that rebuilding was not a task for the military, funds for CIMIC were cut 
during the mission making the work obviously more difficult. This resulted that CIMIC 
officers from the most powerful military in the world had to find NGO’s willing to pay for 
many of their projects (Mockaitis 2004, p. 16). To make up for this the Americans often 
provided these NGO’s and other relief agencies with security and helped them coordinate and 
sometimes facilitated their efforts (Clark 2007, p. 29). Compared to the British and the Dutch 
(as will be shown later) the Americans had the largest dedicated CIMIC contingent. They 
however clearly had given CIMIC a relatively low priority (funds cut off), no indications of 
the taking over any government functions and the acceptance of their CIMIC efforts suffering 
from strict force protection measures. This leads to a low score on CIMIC.  
4.2.4 Force Protection 
For the American troops in Kosovo force protection clearly was their first and foremost 
priority (Gordon et al. p. 108). According to Mockaitis (2004) “Nothing underscores 
American discomfort with peace operations more than the emphasis on force protection at the 
expense even of mission success” (p. 14). He also points out that some suggested that the 
Americans with their overemphasis on force protection seemed to regard force protection “as 
the mission itself, rather than a means to accomplish it” (Mockaitis 2004, p. 15). 
The first that comes to mind when discussing American force protection in Kosovo is Camp 
Bondsteel which became the most pregnant example of the American presence in the 
province. Unlike other KFOR headquarters in Kosovo which were located in major towns, 
Camp Bondsteel was positioned in open country providing wide arcs of fire in case of an 
unlikely siege (Mockaitis 2004, p. 14). Protected with an earthen wall, eleven watchtowers 
and 180 km of barbed wire, Bondsteel was at that time the largest temporary military base 
since Vietnam (Priest 2003, p. 280). But despite Bondsteel being a virtually impregnable 
fortress military personnel was still required to carry a weapon when walking around inside 
the base. A New York born civilian American Albanian interpreter, working for the American 
troops at Bondsteel, thought the army went way too far with their force protection. According 
to her the force-protection measures “seemed to have too many soldiers on the edge. They 
were safer at Camp Bondsteel than she had been in New York city”(Priest 2003, p. 298). The 
camp based roughly five thousand American troops in October 1999 which was then about 
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three-quarters of all the American troops in Kosovo. But of these troops a large percentage 
based at Bondsteel actually never left the camp as they were needed for the sole purpose of 
garrisoning it and operating its many facilities (Mokaitis 2004, p. 14). With a fire department, 
dining facilities, several coffee bars and a Burger King, the camp was dubbed ‘Disneyland’ by 
other NATO troops (Zaalberg 2005, p. 325). And while other nations, most notably the 
British, choose to locate many units within local communities the Americans claimed it to be 
unwise to station soldiers amongst the population (Smith, 1999). 
Not surprisingly force protection culminated when the Americans ventured outside their 
protected base. Only travelling in convoys with minimally four armored trucks, two locked 
and loaded shooters per vehicle, who were always in full combat gear wearing helmets and 
body armor (Mokaitis 2004, p. 14). Interestingly, while most soldiers and officers understood 
that these measures were taken to get them home in one piece, many disliked the overly 
precautions and felt themselves imprisoned. Especially when they compared their modus 
operandi with their European counterparts who mostly could move fare more freely and 
interact with the population (Mokaitis 2004, p. 15). American soldiers “were not generally 
allowed to consume local food or beverages or purchase things from local shops, cafes, and 
business establishments” (Wentz 2002, p. 474). According to Zaalberg (2005): “Most soldiers 
realized that their combatant presentation kept the atmosphere when dealing with the 
population unnecessary tense” (p. 261). And Wentz (2002) reports: “It was felt by many that 
the flack vests, helmets and weapons intimidated local civilians and was awkward and 
disruptive in small offices and other areas where the teams came in contact with the locals” 
(p. 474). Nevertheless the Americans stayed cautious and did not allow individual units to 
adjust their measures to fit the local situation or task (Mockaitis 2004, p. 14). Mockaitis 
(2004) concludes “Robust rules of engagement, over-emphasis on force protection, and the 
impatience of American culture have made U.S. soldiers more confrontational than they need 
to be for most peacekeeping situations”(p. 33). And according to the American Albanian 
translator again, the American soldier “needs to be able to discern between a real threat and a 
created one” (Priest 2003, p. 299). Considering the high level of priority the Americans have 
given to the protection of their bases, their vehicle movements, always wearing body armor 
and helmet when off the base (and even wearing helmets on the base) they clearly score high 
regarding force protection. 
4.2.5 Case analyses 
The American case shows that the tragic events in Somalia in 1993 were nationwide 
experienced as a military defeat. This traumatic experience led rather quickly to a change in 
the American strategic culture resulting in declining support for humanitarian or peacekeeping 
operations and a strong aversion of casualties. The latter was especially persistent with top 
level political and military decision makers who were initially very reluctant when it 
eventually came to deploying ground forces in Kosovo. When they ultimately decided to 
deploy boots on the ground their first and foremost priority evidently was to avoid American 
casualties. Consequently the American threat perception of the operational environment in 
Kosovo was high which resulted in a strong emphasis on force protection. Security operations 
and CIMIC were all seen as of secondary importance and were often hampered or limited by 
measures of force protection. Therefore the overall American effort to provide public security 
as part of its peacekeeping operation in Kosovo could be labeled minimalist.  
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Regarding alternative explanations, it is true that all MNB-sectors experienced outbursts of 
violence and public disorder in the first months but it is possible that the aggression in the 
American sector indeed called for serious force protection measures. In other words, it is 
feasible that the violence outbursts confirmed their initial threat assessment and ensuing high 
threat perception which would have justified strong force protection. It is further possible that 
strong force protection measures furthermore could have increased the tensions with the 
population or at least would not have aided in defusing them. In other words, there could have 
been a question of a self fulfilling prophecy whereas a high threat perception leads to heavy 
force protection leading in turn to a higher threat (perception?) of the operational 
environment.  
4.3 The United Kingdom 
Of all peacekeeping forces in Kosovo the British army was the most experienced in dealing 
with public security. While more than capable of large scale conventional operations and 
taking part in the brunt of the fighting in both World Wars, the British army has for most of 
its history been fighting in expeditionary wars (Cassidy 2005, p. 58). Consequently, 
counterinsurgency, intrastate security and stability operations have been central in the British 
military experience (Cassidy 2005, p. 58). These historic experiences have made and shaped 
Britain’s strategic culture which seemingly has made the British army well suited for the 
challenges presented to them in Kosovo (Mockaitis 2004, p. 23).  
When looking at the history of British strategic culture it is of interest to look at how they 
categorized war or armed conflict in the nineteenth until the second half of the twentieth 
century. During this period  the British spoke of ‘small wars’ when they meant limited 
conventional conflicts that could be dealt with their standing professional army. When they 
spoke of a ‘Great War’ this meant that this was a larger conflict which would require 
conscription. Insurgencies, rebellions or any other kind of violent turmoil which flamed up in 
the empire almost continuously, were not seen as wars and thus not classified as such. When 
responding to this kind of disturbances, which were thought of as business as usual, this was 
mostly labeled as ‘policing’ or ‘counterinsurgency’ (Mockaitis 1993, p. 7). 
It is important to note that these ‘disturbances’ were not primarily seen as a military problem 
and thus were not treated like one. In the minds of the British the idea was that “Unrest must 
be dealt with through a combination of reform (winning ‘hearts and minds’) and police 
measures”(Mockaitis 1993, p.7). The military naturally could be brought in to support the 
police but the basic thought was that soldiers should only be assisting the civil powers. They 
were normally not to act independently as a military force. It was also considered imperative 
that they, just like police forces, would calibrate their use of force and never exceed the level 
that was necessary to restore order. Indiscriminate or excessive use of force was to be avoided 
at all times as this was considered wholly counterproductive (Mockaitis 1993, p. 7; 
Friesendorf 2012, p. 31). Thus during their colonial years the British army acquired the ability 
to calibrate the use of force which eventually was to become their trademark (Friesendorf 
2012, pp. 30-31).  
Their most prolonged, successful and often referred to use of military force in the public 
security domain was the British army operation in Northern Ireland. Starting in 1969, 
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‘Operation Banner’ had daily up to 10.000 soldiers on the streets during the height of the 
conflict in the early seventies (British Army 2006, p. 2). With a total of 600 British 
servicemen killed, 102 of which were lost in 1972 (the largest number in one year since 
Korea), the army’s self-discipline was severely tested (British Army 2006, p. 2). According to 
historian Martin van Creveld, cited in the British army’s official report on their operations in 
Northern Ireland “the British army’s self-discipline, and particularly restraint and forbearance 
in the face of grievous provocation, was a key factor in Northern Ireland” (British Army 2006, 
p. 15). According to the same report the army indeed “rarely over-reacted. It did not respond 
with tanks on the streets. It generally displayed humanity and humor, although during the 
early 1970s this was difficult to sustain and a desire to ‘sort the Micks out’ was often 
apparent” (British Army 2006, p. 15).  
As stated earlier the British army’s campaign in Northern Ireland was the longest in British 
history. The acceptance that operations like these could require years or even decades of 
military commitment seems also a part of British strategic culture. As Cassidy states “The 
British also seem to exhibit more patience when it comes to protracted internal security 
problems, which is probably attributable to a tradition of operating in small, autonomous units 
in isolated and faraway places”(Cassidy 2005, p. 59). Patience is also demonstrated on a 
tactical level with regard to building relations with the population and other local actors. 
When compared to the Americans who, according to Mockaitis, have a ‘low-context’ 
impatient culture were ‘time is money’, the British usually take their time. On the Balkans, 
and in many other cultures, people are not custom to “cut to the chase” and “get to the point” 
but first need time to build a relationship. The British seem to understand this and benefit 
from being able to take a slower pace when the situation requires this (Mockaitis 2004, pp. 
25-26). 
Thus the strategic culture of the British Army, shaped by a long history of ‘Imperial Policing’ 
with its unique ability to calibrate force seems to be well suited for establishing public order. 
But to think that the British have softened since the last World War and would have forgotten 
how to put up a fight is erroneous. As Friesendorf (2012) points out “For the UK maximum 
force has always been the option – the warrior spirit is inculcated in the British Army as much 
as it is in the US military” (p. 32). And indeed, before their intervention in Kosovo they 
launched a successful military campaign against Argentina in 1982 and had participated with 
equal aggression in the Gulf War in 1991 (Friesendorf 2012, p. 30). And even during 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia in the mid-nineties they occasionally showed their teeth as 
they were estimated to have killed more than 200 adversaries up to 1995 (Dodd 1995, p. 11).  
As already observed with regard to their service in Northern Ireland an important aspect of the 
British strategic military culture is their ability to accept own losses. According to Cassidy 
“The British approach to casualties is best described as a stiff-upper-lip attitude. A history of 
taking a limited number of casualties in remote places for unclear reasons has made the 
British tolerable of casualties” (Cassidy 2005, p. 59). And indeed just a few years before their 
involvement in Kosovo the British totaled sixty own troops killed in Bosnia  (Dodd 1995, p. 
11). There are no indications these losses have had any noticeable impact on the British 
military culture and in any way have influenced the execution of operations in Kosovo. As 
Cassidy (2005) states “The British Army does not try to avoid casualties, and it does not seem 
to be averse to taking them” (p. 59). 
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Concluding, the British army is shaped by a strategic culture that makes it proficient of 
executing full scale conventional operations while at the same time it stays capable of 
executing public security tasks were calibrated force is mandatory. And when losses are 
suffered these so far seem to be accepted as part of the deal and do not seem to affect their 
ability to only use calibrated force when needed to (Zaalberg 2005, p. 260). While at the same 
time the British are never shy to use deadly force and can be an aggressive opponent. In short 
the British do not feel that peacekeeping or operations other than war degrade combat skills 
and reduce readiness but instead “believe that the best war fighters make the best 
peacekeepers” (Zaalberg 2005, p. 257).  
4.3.1 The British in Kosovo 
Though the area of the British led MNB-Central was somewhat smaller in size than the rest of 
the MNB areas it was demographically the largest. It included Kosovo’s capital Pristina in 
which KFOR Headquarters and main offices of numerous NGO’s were located (Mockaitis 
2004, p. 23). Enclosed by the French, German and American sectors it bordered Serbia in the 
east.  Entering Kosovo as one of the first KFOR troops the British went in with a significant 
force wielding initially to full brigades in June 1999. At its height in October 1999 MNB-
central counted just over 9.000 troops including soldiers from eight different countries, all 
under British command (Mockaitis 2004, p. 23).  
Where other lead nations seemed overwhelmed by the revenge attacks, massive looting and 
burning of initially Albanian but soon Serbian property, the British were able to prevent much 
destruction by launching foot patrols as soon as they arrived in their area of responsibility 
(Mockaitis 2004, p. 26). Before long the British were filling the security gap left by the 
retreating Serbian security forces and Serbian civil administration. They were soon praised for 
being able to switch from a firm and no-nonsense approach to a more relaxed posture 
(Zaalberg 2005, p. 332).  
4.3.2 Security Operations  
As stated above the British forces went in heavy and wasted no time deploying patrols in an 
effort to prevent the massive violence as occurring in other  areas of the province. Their quick 
and firm deployment prevented much destruction (Mockaitis 2004, p. 26). According to a 
British officer "We will not tolerate any armed group using its muscle. We will respond 
robustly” (Agence France-Presse, 1999). Just like the Americans the British were firm in 
demilitarizing the KLA and started confiscating weapons even before there was an official 
agreement on their disarmament (Zaalberg 2005, p. 305). Regarding British security 
operations it is hard to make a clear distinction between ‘security’ activities like patrolling, 
setting up checkpoints and providing public security on the one hand, and CIMIC on the 
other. In the British concept both are complementary and even with the most basic operational 
tasks the British are able to keep the relations with the environment open. As Mockaitis 
(2004) points out “They manned checkpoints with an easy going, non-confrontational style 
that defused tension” (p. 26). Anticipating the need for law and order expertise the British had 
incorporated some 140 Royal Military Police and about a dozen military Special Investigators 
in their KFOR contingent (Perito 2004, p. 186). In some areas the British also had four times 
as much local interpreters than the Americans (Smith, 1999). Taking public security seriously 
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their activities resulted in fifty arrests by July 7, being only surpassed by the Germans 
(Zaalberg 2005, p. 335). Concluding; their immediate response to civil unrest by deploying 
patrols as soon as they entered their area, their number of arrests, their number of military 
police and active stance on disarming the KLA results to a high score regarding operational 
activities.  
4.3.3 CIMIC 
The best way to describe the British philosophy regarding CIMIC is to quote a British 
commander in Kosovo who stated “CIMIC is every soldier’s job” (Mokaitis 2004, p. 24). 
According to Zaalberg (2005) the British military leadership was inclined to “see civil aspects 
as an integral part of the mission whether dubbed civil-military cooperation, civil affairs, 
civil-military operations, civic action, liaison, or support to the civil power” (p. 393). He 
continues that this was: 
rooted in a long tradition of colonial policing, counterinsurgency and the continued 
involvement of military forces in internal security operations in Northern Ireland. Any level 
of success in these hybrid civil military efforts had relied heavily on the triangular 
relationship between civil administration, civil police and the military ( p. 393).  
Interestingly the British, with twelve staff, had one of the smallest dedicated CIMIC units of 
all lead nations in Kosovo (Mockaitis 2004, p. 24). This however, had nothing to do with any 
disinterest or lack of priority but again reflected the idea that all troops were considered to 
take on CIMIC tasks as an integral part of their job. And in doing so also contributed to their 
own force protection.  
As the British concept of CIMIC puts the emphasis on “dialogue and interaction, rather than 
activities” there has been actually surprisingly limited military involvement in reconstruction 
projects in Kosovo and there are no indications they had taken over any government functions 
besides public security (Zaalberg 2007, p. 16). But this does not seemed to have any 
detrimental effect on the relations with the population and other civilian actors (Zaalberg 
2007, p. 16). Mockaitis (2004) confirms this and finds the British approach overall impressive 
(p. 26). According to him “UNHCR representatives and NGO personnel generally found the 
British to be more effective at CIMIC than other national contingents”(p. 26). And “Several 
NGO/IO observers described them as “in a class by themselves” among the NATO 
peacekeepers” (p. 26). So the British, despite having officially the smallest CIMIC 
detachment of all lead nations, actually had all their officers and men acting with a CIMIC 
mindset. So from an alternative point of view it could be argued the British actually had the 
largest CIMIC force of all. Either way, despite having not taken over any local government 
function, the British clearly score high on CIMIC.  
4.3.4 Force Protection 
While certainly not shy to use deadly force when threatened, the British concept of force 
protection goes far beyond the use of firepower and physical precautions. To them good 
relations with the local community often provides them useful intelligence which they feel is 
about just as important to protecting the troops as helmets and body armor. The British also 
believe that muscular conventional force protection does more to create a barrier between 
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peacekeepers and the population than it does any good (Mockaitis 2004, p. 25). Many years of 
experience in small wars and counterinsurgency seemed to have taught the British to prefer 
only to use minimal force, and only if need be (Cassidy 2005, p. 59). The British in Kosovo 
often referred to their Northern Ireland experience where many of them had served (Zaalberg 
2005, p. 261). For the British force protection is part CIMIC and vice versa. A British 
company commander in Pristina said patrolling in pairs and staying close to the community 
allowed his soldiers to: 
get under the skin of the place, to establish a database on the pattern of life and determine 
who's doing what, to have a cup of coffee with everybody. It's in the training we got from 
Northern Ireland to look for something that doesn't fit in (Smith, 1999).   
Thus in Kosovo the British approach to force protection can be described as firm but 
approachable. With their forces widely dispersed they were often located in bases cordoned 
only with white plastic tape instead of barbed wire and sandbags (Smith, 1999). Some British 
units hired apartments in isolated villages where they tried to speak the language and look 
after the needs of the population (Zaalberg 2005, p. 261). Mockaitis (2004) confirms this and 
describes they also “billeted soldiers with Serbians frightened of Albanian retaliation”(p. 26). 
And although they tried to settle local disputes by mediation the British were not afraid to 
teach obstinate locals a lesson by beating them up (Zaalberg 2005, p. 333).  
Having a different threat perception than for instance their American counterparts, they 
almost always patrolled on foot. Especially in built-up areas they preferred to walk about and 
made sure it was always the same group of soldiers that patrolled the same villages and 
neighborhoods (Zaalberg 2005, p.333). Almost never wearing their helmets the British had 
put on berets and their weapons slung around their backs (Zaalberg 2005, p. 261). According 
to a British officer in Kosovo "To wear body armor and a helmet is the wrong psychological 
approach. It also makes you tired, so you can't concentrate. And a helmet makes you look 
down, instead of up. It's like being behind a desk" (Smith, 1999). The British approach of 
force protection is clearly not one based on physical protective measures but on being able to 
anticipate on possible dangers by keeping the distance between the population and the troops 
as small as possible. Thus in a conventional way the British score low on force protection.  
4.3.5 Case analyses:  
The British case evidently shows a strategic culture that radiates self confidence gained 
through both earlier and more recent positive military experiences in the public security 
domain. An important part of their strategic culture is the notion that casualties are an 
unavoidable reality of military deployment. This resulted in what in retrospect appears to be a 
threat perception that seemed permissive to adjustment and able to adapt to a changing 
environment. It is possible that the British high score on operational activities, especially in 
the first violent phase of the deployment, actually helped to reduce the threat in the long run 
as the British showed the Kosovar Albanians, that they were serious in keeping things under 
control. In any case their threat perception allowed them to score low on conventional force 
protection but it is beyond doubt they would have increased their protective measures if their 
threat perception had asked for it. As described earlier, their emphasis on CIMIC is for a large 
part instigated by considerations of force protection. Their good relations with the population 
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made it possible to keep their physical force protection at a relatively low level especially 
when compared to other nations. Therefore the overall British effort to provide public security 
as part of its peacekeeping operation in Kosovo could be labeled vacuum-filler.  
It could be argued that the British sector was relatively safe and strong force protection 
measures were not necessary. In addition, a permissive environment would also make it easier 
to interact with the population hence their high score on CIMIC. The researched sources have 
given however no indication that this would be the case.   
4.4 The Netherlands 
For most of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century Dutch strategic culture 
was that of a colonial power which looked at the greater powers (Britain, France, Germany, 
and of course the US) as role models (French & Tjepkema 2010, p. 3). Although neutrality 
had always been the preferred position in international affairs in that period “the Dutch have 
always been prepared to fight when their interests were at stake” (Biehl, Giegerich, Jonas. 
2013, p. 265). In the Dutch colonies many insurgencies were fought and also during the 
Second World War the Dutch military bravely showed its teeth. It was only after the Second 
World War, followed by wars of decolonization and the subsequent loss of the Netherlands 
Indies, that the days of unilateral military campaigns were finally over (Biehl et al. 2013, p. 
265). In the postwar years that followed the Netherlands slowly developed into the typical 
postmodern state as we know it today. In his article ‘The new Liberal Imperialism’ Robert 
Cooper (2003) writes that the postmodern state “rejects force for resolving disputes and 
consequently codify self-enforced rules of behavior”. And that “Security is based on 
transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability” (Cooper, 2003). In 
this new world “Western European countries no longer want to fight each other” (Cooper, 
2003). These characteristics can be easily applied to the Dutch who have wholeheartedly 
embraced the postmodern system. Because of its dependence on international trade, the 
pursuit of international stability was to become the “primary Dutch security goal with stable 
international relations a prerequisite for the absence of external threat, the promotion of 
prosperity and the maintenance of internal stability” (French & Tjepkema 2010, p. 4). 
Because of the Dutch political tradition of negotiation and compromise “a legalistic/normative 
order” became fundamental in dealing with more powerful nations and “explains the strong 
Dutch emphasis on both international rule of law and ethics” (French & Tjepkema 2010, p. 4). 
The Dutch NATO membership is also confirmed as a means to have influence in dealing with 
stronger nations on the continent (De Wijk & Van Ham 2005, p. 9). With an constitutional 
amendment to promote international order the Dutch have been military involved in more 
than a dozen significant and an even higher number of less prominent peacekeeping 
operations for the last forty years.  Actively trying to improve the world is considered by 
some authors even a part of the Dutch self image (Biehl et al. 2013, p. 264). 
The Dutch had been involved in peacekeeping on the Balkans since 1992 which is mostly 
remembered by the dramatic events that took place in Srebrenica in 1995. In July 1995 
Bosnian-Serb military forces started an offensive against a Bosnian-Muslim enclave located 
around the town of Srebrenica. The enclave was designated a safe area by the UN and 
protected by a Dutch peacekeeping battalion. As Muslim refugees kept pouring in looking for 
safety Bosnian-Serb forces increased pressure on the enclave cornering the Dutch and the 
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frightened population. After five days the Dutch battalion, feeling completely outgunned and 
outmanned, surrendered and subsequently withdrew from the enclave. Not before long it 
became clear that, after the Dutch troops had left, the Bosnian-Serbs had shot almost all 
Muslim men in Srebrenica totaling up to 7.000 killed (NIOD, 2002; Priest 2003, p. 261). 
These horrific events led to an international and national outcry and feelings of 
embarrassment and guilt were felt collectively throughout the nation (Giphart, 2000). The 
Srebrenica affair eventually resulted in a Dutch parliamentary enquiry, a Dutch cabinet 
resignation and multiple lawsuits against the Dutch state and Dutch military commanders.  
This historical event clearly had an effect on Dutch strategic culture. The same year the 
tragedy took place the Dutch government, determined never to repeat the Srebrenica scenario 
again, formulated strict criteria which any future military deployment had to meet. Among 
others it was stated that Dutch involvement in international peacekeeping operations was no 
longer to be taken for granted. Furthermore there needed to be a clear command structure, 
solid and unambiguous agreements with international partners, plainly formulated and 
feasible mission goals and the mission needed to have a fixed end date (Politiek en Parlement, 
1998). When an eventual participation of Dutch ground troops in Kosovo became apparent 
(the Dutch had already participated in the NATO air campaign against Serbia) the Dutch were 
resolutely sticking to their checklist and were keen on the safety of their military personnel. 
The Dutch would only participate under a clear UN mandate and under the strict condition 
that American ground forces would also be deployed (Politiek en Parlement, 1998). When the 
green light eventually was given the Ministry of Defense made sure it kept its troops under a 
tight grip determined never to repeat the disastrous events of 1995 (Zaalberg 2005, p. 320).  
4.4.1 The Dutch in Kosovo 
As part of the German-led MNB-South the Dutch (artillery) battalion was initially planned as 
a rear-echelon (fire) support unit for the German brigade and placed under German command 
(Zaalberg 2005, p. 299). The MNB was planned to be centered around the town of Prizren, 
the second largest town of Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p. 297). But as it happened just one day 
after entering Kosovo it was decided that the entire Dutch battalion was to be redirected to the 
town of Orahovac. With a large Serb minority living in Orahovac and strong KLA positions 
around it, it was negotiated that the Dutch would be tasked to provide protection for the Serbs 
(Zaalberg 2005, p.300). While still under German command which was located in Prizren, the 
Dutch were virtually on their own in Orahovac. So instead of a rear echelon support role they 
were now made responsible for a municipality of 65.000 people (Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). This 
was the beginning of what was to be called Task Force Orahovac.  
4.4.2 Security Operations  
Although the first days in Orahovac were relatively quiet compared to other parts of Kosovo 
this quickly changed and before long all operational activities were focused on providing 
basic public security (Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). And while no proof was found it was organized, 
arson and looting started on a large scale soon after the Serbian forces had left the area 
(Zaalberg 2005, p. 314). According to Friesendorf (2009) “The Dutch, with the shadow of 
Srebrenica over them, tried to establish a modicum of order” (p. 94). Thus in a matter of days 
all troops that could be spared, including cooks and mechanics, were put on the streets in an 
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effort to stop the chaos (Van Loon 2002, p. 119). Patrolling both on foot and in vehicles the 
troops were occasionally confronted with cases of maltreatment and theft (Van Loon 2002, 
pp. 119-120; Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). But compared with some other MNB’s there were only 
very few threats made directly to the soldiers. Van Loon (2002) points out that although 
caught criminals were not happy, much went in an atmosphere of mutual respect (p. 121). 
After six weeks twenty German and some twelve Dutch military police took over most of the 
policing (Zaalberg 2005, p. 326). When the UN finally took over in October, 75 arrests had 
been made by Task Force Orahovac (Van Loon 2002, p. 121; Zaalberg 2005, p. 336). Besides 
the humanitarian aspect another reason to take on public security was to deny the KLA the 
opportunity to act as the new Kosovo police force. This was the ambition of the KLA but was 
considered an extremely undesirable option (Van Loon 2002, p. 120). 
Initially the KLA was left alone and was only disarmed after the disarmament agreement on 
the 21
st
 of June. And this was firstly only enforced in the town itself as there were too few 
troops to also police the countryside (Zaalberg 2005, p. 305). And although the KLA was 
generally cooperative the Kosovo gun culture sometimes necessitated to show military muscle 
in the shape of a tank to persuade local powerbrokers to hand in weapons or dismantle a 
checkpoint without loss of face (Zaalberg 2005, p. 307). But nevertheless Zaalberg (2005) 
remarks that “The Dutch soldiers had an overall good-natured and relaxed attitude and were 
often seen joking with most of the population as they patrolled the streets, which tended to 
charm the Albanian majority” (p. 329). But more pregnant, according to Van Loon (2002) it 
was only for the Dutch effort in Orahovac that the Serb minority was saved from the worst of 
consequences in the first months of KFOR’s  deployment (p. 119). 
As described above the Dutch immediately responded to the civil unrest by deploying every 
available soldier on patrol in order to restore order. Compared with the Americans and the 
British they had the highest number  of arrests but the smallest number of military police. 
They did disarm the KLA but not before the agreement was made and had insufficient troops 
to enforce this in the countryside. The Dutch score high on security operations.  
4.4.3 CIMIC 
When planning for the mission initially no CIMIC activity was foreseen as the Dutch were 
expected only to serve as fire support for the German brigade. And although the general idea 
was that CIMIC was actually something for specialists, two artillery officers were later 
appointed as CIMIC-officers (Van Loon 2002, p. 117). The initial low priority given to 
CIMIC is also indicated by the fact the Dutch had no translators with them when entering 
Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p. 326). In addition of the two CIMIC-officers, a few days after 
entering Orahovac two senior non-commissioned officers were put in charge of what was to 
be called the ‘complaints bureau’. At this location the population could tell their stories and 
voice their complaints which took away a lot of anger and frustration (Van Loon 2002, 
p.120). Zaalberg (2005) confirms this and adds that “The ‘complaints bureau’ turned out to be 
one of the most fruitful initiatives of the operation “(pp. 326-327). With basic public security 
on an acceptable level after a few months the Dutch were now expanding their efforts to other 
terrains and a start was made with the setting up of a municipal administration. Under Dutch 
KFOR auspices Serbian and Albanian administrators were gradually set to work and clear out 
the mess (Van Loon 2002, p. 122). Also garbage collection, water and power supply and even 
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assisting the distribution of food supplies was initiated or assisted by Dutch KFOR-troops 
(Van Loon 2002, p. 123). In fact:  
Most of the city’s public services were either already being run by KFOR, operated in 
coordination with international governmental agencies or NGOs, or delegated to local staff 
after having been initiated by the Dutch. In order to operate effectively and assure access to 
all ethnic groups, basic public services such as the fire department and the hospital were under 
military control for the time being (Zaalberg 2005, p. 386).  
There truly seemed to be no limit as even “An attempt was made to jump-start production in 
the local wine factory and the plastic factory by using some of the military’s vast logistical 
capabilities” (Zaalberg 2005, p. 387). Although the two designated CIMIC officers played an 
important role subsequently the whole battalion was actually performing CIMIC on a daily 
basis (Van loon, 2002). Without proper training and with a lot of improvisation this was 
absolutely not what they had expected to be doing when they entered Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, 
p.330). Nevertheless their efforts seemed to be held in high regard by the UNHCR (Van Loon 
2002, p 126). The Dutch, despite having probably the smallest CIMIC detachment of all 
nations, had just like the British almost all their officers and men performing CIMIC. But 
instead of the British, the Dutch went out of their way to assist and often run local 
government functions. The Dutch clearly score high on CIMIC.  
4.4.4 Force Protection 
Surprisingly little information is available regarding the way the Dutch handled their force 
protection in Kosovo. Like all KFOR troops entering the province in June 1999 they were 
prepared for violent encounters with the Serbian forces and possibly the KLA. As part of the 
German MNB, who put the same excessive emphasis on force protection as the Americans, 
the Dutch initially went in heavy and conventional (Mockaitis 2004, p. 19). But although the 
Dutch were wearing helmets and armored vests in the first chaotic months in Orahovac this is 
never mentioned again in later reporting (Zaalberg 2005, p. 312). Interestingly the Dutch, 
though formally part of the German MNB with its high level of German force protection, 
seemed to have quickly adapted to the relatively permissible environment. Soon all efforts of 
Task Force Orahovac were focused on CIMIC activities which were unlikely to have taken 
such proportion with a strong emphasis on force protection. The absence of any reporting 
mentioning force protection after the first months in Orahovac probably indicates that this was 
hardly an issue at all.  Consequently the Dutch score low on force protection.  
4.4.5 Case analyses 
In 1995 the Dutch were confronted with a worst case peacekeeping scenario in Srebrenica 
which led to national feelings of embarrassment and guilt. These sentiments instigated Dutch 
political decision makers, adamant never to be put in a Srebrenica-like situation again, to 
quickly formulate strict criteria which were to be met when considering future peacekeeping 
operations. With Srebrenica fresh in mind the Dutch were at first reserved and cautious when 
it came to troop deployment in Kosovo. Ultimately Dutch troops were only to be committed 
for one year and initially just as rear echelon support troops under German command. When 
the Dutch, much to their own surprise, quickly were made responsible for the security of the 
Serbian minority in Orahovac, they nonetheless did not need much encouragement to make 
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the best of it. Based on the available sources it is however quite hard to assess the initial 
Dutch threat perception. The fact that they first only opted for a support role implies that they 
wanted to avoid any ‘frontline’ responsibility which could indicate a high threat perception. 
This would likely be related to their Srebrenica experience.  
Scoring high on security operations could be also be linked to the Srebrenica experience as 
the Dutch were resolute that they would now do everything to prevent civilian casualties 
under their responsibility. With regard to CIMIC, although initially very low on the agenda as 
they had planned for their support role, the Dutch quickly embraced the British model making 
every soldier responsible for CIMIC. It obviously differed from the British in that the Dutch 
almost literally took over or strongly supported all public services in the municipality whereas 
the British focus on personal contact and negotiation instead. With regard to force protection 
it is most probably that this got a low priority after the first few months in the mission and the 
situation calmed down. Scoring high on security operations, high on CIMIC and low on force 
protection is typical for the vacuum-filler approach. It does however imply a low threat 
perception which is actually difficult to explain with regard to the effects of Srebrenica on the 
Dutch strategic culture. It is probable that their approach, at least for some part, could be 
attributed to the relative permissiveness of the operational environment. Both Zaalberg and 
Van Loon confirm the relative safety of Orahovac after the initial first months, especially 
when compared to other sectors.  
5 Conclusion 
The Americans show that the tragic events in Somalia, that were experienced as a painful 
military defeat, quickly influenced its strategic culture resulting in great reluctance regarding 
humanitarian or peacekeeping interventions and above all a strong aversion of casualties. And 
whereas six years later the American public seemed to be sensitive for the suffering of the 
Kosovar Albanians and a majority favored sending ground troops, the American leadership 
was dragging its feet. When American troops were eventually sent the political and military 
leadership’s main goal seemed above all to avoid American casualties. This led to a 
minimalist approach with regard to the security gap in Kosovo. In turn the generally positive 
recent British military experiences, which had an ingrained notion of accepting casualties, led 
to strategic culture of robust self confidence that had a far more ‘outgoing’ approach than the 
Americans with regard to the security gap. This led to an overall vacuum-filler approach. As a 
result of the national trauma caused by the events in Srebrenica the Dutch initially were very 
reluctant when it came to consider a possible new military adventure on the Balkans. When 
Dutch troops were ultimately deployed in Kosovo it was under closely guarded conditions and 
they were initially only to perform rear echelon duties. When circumstances dictated that they 
were to take on a far greater responsibility than anticipated, namely the protection of a large 
number of civilians, the Dutch gave it their best effort without hesitation. This is likely 
attributed to their strong desire never to repeat a Srebrenica like scenario which had left deep 
scars of embarrassment but above all guilt in their strategic culture. However, in addition it 
must be noted that the relative permissiveness of the operational environment did facilitate 
this extravert approach.    
It could be argued that the operational environment was not equal in the three sectors. And 
there are indications that the aggression towards the Serbian minority was more intense in 
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American sector, whereas the Dutch sector was known to be relatively permissible. In the 
American and British cases it is however unlikely that this would have significantly 
influenced the outcome of the analyses. This because the Americans maintained a strong force 
protection posture long after the situation in their area had calmed down. Regardless of the 
actual threat, their threat perception remained high. The British, as stated earlier, simply 
adjust their posture to the environment so this would not have significantly influenced the 
outcome of the analyses either. The interesting question remains what the Dutch reaction 
would have been when confronted with a more hostile environment. Would they, as reflected 
in their initial reluctance, perhaps would even have abandoned the mission adhering to their 
political and military abort criteria? Or if they had stayed, would they then had focused 
primary on their own protection? Or would they, fuelled by the burden of guilt, have also 
done their utmost best to protect the civilians with less regard for their own safety? Both 
options could be plausibly explained with regard to their Srebrenica experience.  
So does the theory of Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the difference in the 
way similar armies deal with a security gap? In the case of the American and the British 
clearly yes. Relatively recent defeats as well as victories are shown to affect a nation’s 
strategic culture leading to related behavior. In the Dutch case the outcome is somewhat 
ambiguous as stated earlier. Circumventing this indefinite outcome by classifying the events 
in Srebrenica as an experience of defeat rather than of an experience of guilt would still not 
have explained their high score on security operations and CIMIC and low score on force 
protection. Lastly it would be interesting to further investigate if there is a divergence in the 
strategic culture as embodied in the general public and that embodied in the political and 
military decision makers. This situation is suggested in the American case and is also part of 
the notion of second generation scholars of strategic culture.  
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